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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
-vs- : Case No. 
14478 
BERT JAMES DURRANT, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of the crime 
of automobile homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann- § 
76-5-207 (1953), as amended, in the Fourth District Court, 
Utah County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty by a jury of the crime 
of automobile homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-207 (1953), as amended, before the Honorable Allen B. 
Sorensen, Judge, presiding. Appellant was thereafter 
sentenced to a term of five years probation and to serve 
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thirty days in the Utah County Jail. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower 
court's decision finding appellant guilty of automobile 
homicide. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 2:00 a.m. on the morning of April 17, 1975, 
the appellant with three other persons riding in his vehicle 
collided with a parked construction earthmoving vehicle in the 
area of 695 East 700 North, American Fork, Utah (R.47-54, 
Exhibits). As a result, Mrs. Cindy Edwards was killed in 
the collision (R.40-41). Appellant was then taken to 
American Fork Hospital where he was admitted and given 
emergency treatment (R.51-52). At this time, appellant was 
receiving medical treatment from a registered nurse, Dr. 
Murdock, a licensed physician, and Mr. Linebaugh, a 
technologist specializing in blood analysis at the American 
Fork Hospital (T.4,27). At the request of Dr. Murdock and 
under his direction and supervision, Mr. Linebaugh, an 
experienced technician of seventeen years, withdrew blood 
from the appellant in accordance with standard medical 
practice (T.4,27). Mr. Linebaugh testified that although 
he was authorized to withdraw blood from appellant, no one 
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actually stood over his shoulder and watched his every 
move (R.74-75). 
The lower court found that the State had provided 
appellant with a "duly authorized technician"in compliance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (f) (1953), as amended. 
The appellant was taken to American Fork Hospital and 
thereby placed in a very sanitary environment. In the 
presence of a registered nurse and a licensed physician, 
Mr. Linebaugh was requested and directed to withdraw 
blood from appellant (T.4,27). The trial court found 
that under the facts of this case, the State provided a 
"duly authorized technician." On appellate review, the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah must view the findings 
of the trial court in a favorable light consistent with 
those findings. 
Secondly, appellant claims that it was error 
for the lower court not to instruct the jury to "criminal 
negligence." The law in Utah has always been that "simple 
negligence" is sufficient for the offense of automobile 
homicide; therefore, the lower court was correct in 
refusing to instruct upon an element which is totally 
inapplicable to the charged offense. 
-3-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respondent respectfully submits that in the 
instant case, the State provided a "duly authorized 
technician" and that the trial court was correct in 
denying appellant's requested instruction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 (f) 
(1953), AS AMENDED, THE STATE PROVIDED A "DULY 
AUTHORIZED" LABORATORY TECHNICIAN TO WITHDRAW BLOOD 
FROM APPELLANT UNDER THE DIRECTION AND SUPERVISION OF 
A LICENSED PHYSICIAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARD 
MEDICAL PRACTICE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (f) (1953), as 
amended, sets forth the standard to be followed to 
withdraw blood for chemical testing from those 
suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
The statute provides: 
" (f) Only a physician, 
registered nurse, practical nurse 
or duly authorized laboratory 
technician, acting at the request 
of a police officer can withdraw 
blood for the purpose of determining 
the alcoholic or drug content therein. 
This limitation shall not apply to 
the taking of a urine or breath 
specimen. Any physician, registered 
-4-
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nurse, practical nurse or duly 
authorized laboratory technician 
who, at the direction of a peace 
officer, draws a sample of blood 
from any person whom the peace 
officer has reason to believe is 
driving in violation of this 
chapter, or hospital or medical 
facility at which such sample is 
drawn, shall be immune from any 
civil or criminal liability arising 
therefrom, provided such test is 
administered according to standard 
medical practice." 
In the instant case, the State provided a "duly 
authorized medical laboratory technician" within the 
language of the statute to withdraw blood from the 
appellant in accordance with standard medical practice. 
Blood was withdrawn from the appellant by Mr. 
Linebaugh (T.4). Mr. Linebaugh is a medical technologist 
at the American Fork Hospital and has specialized at the 
hospital in blood analysis and drawing blood for ten 
years (T.4,27). Mr. Linebaugh has a total of seventeen 
years experience in drawing and analyzing blood and has a 
bachelor's degree in Chemistry, a minor in Bacteriology, and 
is registered with the American Society of Clinical Path-
ology (T.27). Mr. Linebaugh is responsible for the blood 
analysis of half of all the patients at the American Fork 
-5-
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Hospital and through his career has withdrawn blood from 
thousands of patients (T.27,28). 
In the instant case, appellant was taken to 
American Fork Hospital and was thereby placed in a totally 
sanitary environment. Present at this time were Mr. 
Linebaugh, the medical technologist, a superivising 
registered nurse, and a licensed physician, Dr. Dale 
Murdock (T.4). At the request of Dr. Murdock, as well 
as the request from the police officer, Mr. Linebaugh 
withdrew blood from the appellant in accordance with 
standard medical practice at the American Fork Hospital 
(T.4). It is clear from the facts of this case that 
Mr. Linebaugh was acting under the direction and super-
vision of Dr. Murdock, a licensed physician, and a 
registered nurse, when he withdrew blood from appellant, 
thereby establishing sufficient compliance with the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-4410(f) (1953), as 
amended. 
In a recent Utah Supreme Court case, Gibbs v. 
Dorius, 533 P.2d 299 (1975), this Court defined the meaning 
of "duly authorized laboratory technician." This Court 
held: 
-6-
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"Within the context of Section 
41-6-44.10 (f) the term 'duly authorized 
laboratory technician1 means an indi-
vidual acting under the direction and 
supervision of a licensed physician. 
Such a person must 'administer the 
test . . . according to standard 
medical practice.1 There is no evidence 
in the record showing Mr. Davis to be 
such a person." 
In the Gibbs case, appellant was to have his blood withdrawn 
by a technician, not under the supervision of a licensed 
physician and not in accordance with standard medical 
practice because appellant was in the unsanitary environ-
ment of the Salt Lake City and County Jail (unsanitary 
for medical purposes). There was no evidence in the Gibbs 
case showing the technician to be a "duly authorized 
laboratory technician." 
However, in the instant case, Mr. Linebaugh, the 
medical technologist, was in the presence of several 
registered nurses, and Dr. Dale Murdock,a licensed physician, 
who requested the blood tests (T.4). Mr. Linebaugh clearly 
withdrew blood from the appellant in the sanitary environ-
ment of American Fork Hospital under the direction and 
supervision of Dr. Murdock and several superivising 
registered nurses (T.4). 
-7-
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Contrary to appellant's position, it is 
respondent's position that the phrase "acting under 
the direction and supervision of a licensed physician" 
as expounded in the Gibbs case, does not mean the 
physician must stand by the side of the technician 
and hold his hand as he withdraws blood from appellants. 
In State v. Mari, Sup. Ct. Colo., 528 P.2d 917 
(1974), defendant was convicted of driving while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor. The defendant 
contended that under the Colorado statute, the medical 
technologist was not qualified to withdraw blood for 
the purpose of determining the alcoholic content therein. 
The Colorado statute states: 
"The test shall be administered 
at the direction of the arresting officer 
if he has reasonable grounds to believe 
such person was driving a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor, and in accordance with rules and 
regulations prescribed by the state board 
of public health, and with utmost respect 
for the constitutional rights, dignity 
of person, and health of the person being 
tested. The arresting officer may not 
take a blood sample, and no person except 
a physician, registered nurse, or a 
person whose normal duties include with-
drawing blood samples under the super-
vision of a physician or registered nurse 
shall be entitled to withdraw blood for 
the purpose of determining the alcoholic 
content therein." 1967 Perm. Supp., 
CRS, 13-5-30(3)(b). 
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In the Mari case, the technician was under 
the direction and supervision of a doctor, but the 
doctor was not present at the time the blood was 
withdrawn and defendant claimed this as error. 
The Court stated: 
"The defendant, on the 
other hand, asserts that because 
Mrs. Lambert was not, at the 
moment she withdrew defendant's 
blood, acting under the super-
vision of a doctor or registered 
nurse, she did not come within 
the class of persons qualified 
by the statute to withdraw 
blood. We do not read the 
statute to require on-the-spot 
supervision; on the contrary, if 
her normal duties as a medical 
technologist include withdraw-
ing blood samples while she 
is under the supervision of 
a physician or registered nurse, 
she qualifies notwithstanding 
the fact that supervision was 
not present at this time. We 
read the 'under supervision' 
clause as referring to any 
'normal duties' and not as a 
requirement that the super-
vision be present at the 
time the technician withdraws 
the blood." 
-9-
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In State v. Stover, Or. App., 513 P.2d 
537 (1973) , a case which was later reversed on other 
grounds, defendant was convicted of negligent homicide. 
Defendant claimed that the blood sample used in the 
test in question was not obtained in compliance with 
ORE 4 83.640, which provides: 
"In conducting a chemical 
test of the blood, only a duly 
licensed physician or a person 
acting under his direction 
or control may withdraw blood 
or pierce human tissues." 
The Court held that: 
"When blood samples are 
taken, ORS 483.640 minimizes 
the impact of that procedure 
on the driver in question, and 
maximizes the chances that pro-
cedures will be used that do not 
contaminate the blood sample in 
a way as to affect a subsequent 
test of it for alcohol content. 
: Given these probable legislative 
purposes, we conclude the re-
quirement that blood be with-
drawn by Ba person acting under 
* * * [the] direction or con-
trol1 of a licensed physician 
means only that blood be with-
drawn in a medically accepted 
manner by someone who is 
ordinarily supervised by 
physicians; the statute does, 
not literally mean that a 
physician must be physically 
present when the blood is with-
drawn . " 
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The purpose of Section 41-6-44.10(f), Utah 
Code Ann. (1953), as amended, is obvious; to protect 
citizens from the dangers inherent in incursions into 
a person by one not duly authorized in accordance 
with standard medical practice. 
As this court stated in Gibbs v. Dorius, 
supra, at 301: 
"There are situations, in 
this area of law enforcement, 
when blood tests would not only 
be appropriate but may be necessary, 
as the only means of securing 
analysis. Such situations, almost 
invariably occur when a lawfully 
supervised, sanitary condition 
exists." 
Respondent respectfully submits that in the 
instant case a lawfully supervised, sanitary condition 
did exist. The appellant in the instant case was 
taken to a hospital and had his blood withdrawn by 
an experienced medical technologist who was under 
the direction and supervision of a licensed physician 
in accordance with standard medical practice, thereby 
constituting a "duly authorized technician" in compliance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-4410(f)r (1953), as amended. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the 
trial court had sufficient evidence to find Mr. Linebaugh 
to be a "duly authorized laboratory technician" and that 
evidence must be viewed with an eye favorable to those 
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findings including all fair inferences which can be 
drawn from the evidence and the circumstances. 
Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d, 183, 185, 515 P.2d 
442 (1973). 
POINT II 
AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-5-207 REQUIRES ONLY SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE IN A 
PERSON'S DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL, IF AS A RESULT HE CAUSES THE DEATH OF 
ANOTHER PERSON. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (1953), as amended, 
provides the following: 
11
 (1) Criminal homicide con-
stitutes automobile homicide if 
the actor, while under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor, 
a controlled substance, or any 
drug, to a degree which renders the 
actor incapable of safely driving 
a vehicle, causes the death of an-
other by operating a motor vehicle 
in a negligent manner. 
(2) The presumption established 
by section 41-6-44 (b) of the Utah 
Motor Vehicle Act, relating to 
blood alcohol percentages, shall 
be applicable to this section and 
any chemical test administered on 
a defendant with his consent or 
after his arrest under this section, 
whether with or against his con-
sent, shall be admissible in 
accordance with the rules of evidence. 
(3) For purposes of the auto-
mobile homicide section, a motor 
vehicle constitutes any self-
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propelled vehicle and includes, but 
is not limited to, any automobile, 
truck, van, motorcycle, train, 
engine, watercraft, or aircraft, 
(4) Automobile homicide is a 
felony of the third degree." 
The automobile homicide statute clearly 
speaks in terms of simple negligent operation of a 
motor vehicle which results in the death of another, 
not "criminal negligence," therefore,the trial court 
was correct in refusing to instruct the jury upon an 
element which is totally inapplicable to the crime 
charged. Respondent submits that the legislation 
must be read in the light of its clear language 
and import. Therefore, the trial court was correct 
in instructing the jury concerning the degree of 
negligence necessary for the offense of automobile 
homicide• 
It has always been the rule in Utah that 
automobile homicide is an offense requiring simple 
negligence when the driver is under the influence 
of alcohol which results in the death of another. 
In State v. Johnson, 12 Utah 2d 220, 364 P.2d 1019 
(1961), defendant was convicted of automobile homicide. 
This Court held that: the crime of automobile homicide 
required only simple negligence and went on to state 
that: 
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"It seems evident that our 
legislature has concluded that the 
time has now come when we must 
recognize that any kind of 
vehicular negligence, mingled with 
gas and booze, produces a lethal 
mixture that, if it cause death 
should penalize to a greater 
degree than before, the mobile, 
tipsy vehicle-operating brew-
master, in order to bring to a 
screeching halt the mounting 
holocaust daily dedicated to 
traffic fatalities." 
I n
 State v. Risk, • Utah 2d , 520 P.2d 215 
(1974), defendant was convicted of automobile homicide 
and this court again held that the offense of automobile 
homicide may be made out by simple negligence in a 
personfs driving while under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor if as a result thereof he causes 
the death of another person. 
Appellant maintains that the trial court 
should have instructed the jury in terms of "criminal 
negligence". However, it is obvious from the clear 
language of the automobile homicide statute, and from 
well established principles of law in the State of 
Utah that criminal negligence is not an element of 
the offense of automobile homicide. Therefore, 
appellant was not prejudiced or prevented from having 
a fair trial because the trial court refused to give 
i 
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an instruction to a totally erroneous element of 
the offense of automobile homicide. Respondent 
respectfully submits that the lower court was correct 
in refusing to instruct the jury on "criminal neg-
ligence" as an element in the crime of automobile 
homicide under the facts of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that under 
the facts of this case the State of Utah provided 
appellant with a "duly authorized" technician, as 
found by the lower court and that "simple negligence" 
not "criminal negligence" is sufficient for the offense 
of automobile homicide. Respondent respectfully sub-
mits that the lower court decision be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
. Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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